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What is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness in Cosmopolitical 
Thought1 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines Kant’s ‘orientation’ for political thought and the way in which it 
sets up a normative temporal hierarchy between different peoples and different 
histories. It examines the question of whether and ‘orientation without orientalism’ 
within cosmopolitical theory is possible through a contrast between Habermas’s 
cosmopolitanism and Connolly’s immanent naturalism. It concludes that it is only 
when cosmopolitical thought becomes heterotemporally oriented that the aspiration to 
cosmopolitan scope for ethical and political claims will be met. 
 
Introduction 
 
 - - other cultures do not initially confront us as 
alien societies, since their structures remind us 
of previous phases of our own social 
development.2 
  
Habermas makes the above comment in a discussion about the different points 
of view from which western culture encounters its others and vice versa in the 
contemporary world. Whereas non-western cultures experience the west as an 
overarching global power, a threatening future, western culture experiences the non-
west as a reminder of its own past. The idea of non-simultaneity in the encounter 
between west and non-west is a common point of view, one that has become deeply 
ingrained in much of western thought.3 Moreover, it is frequently enmeshed with a 
different claim. As Barry Hindess points out there are two characteristic tendencies in 
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western social and political thought: one is the tendency to assign (non-western) 
contemporaries to the world of the past; the other is the tendency to consign those 
belonging to the past to the realm of moral and intellectual failure.4 This paper argues 
that these twin tendencies are embedded in the response to the problem of 
‘orientation’ in thought first posed and answered by Kant in a way that has continued 
to shape contemporary cosmopolitical thinking. This is the problem of the 
impossibility of perspectiveless thinking faced by the political philosopher committed 
to the moral law. The paper goes on to argue that as long as a Kantian solution to the 
problem of orientation in thought holds sway in contemporary cosmopolitical theories 
then such theories will fail to achieve the cosmopolitical reach to which they aspire. 
The progressive impact and timeliness of such attempts to address issues of global 
rights and justice are undermined by a presumed, but rarely acknowledged, 
asymmetrical structure in the ethico-political relation between political theorists of 
cosmopolitan rights and justice and the majority of the global audience to whom, or 
on behalf of whom, their arguments are, directly or indirectly, addressed.  
In what follows, I examine the link between the two tendencies identified by 
Hindess, that is to say, the link between understandings of socio-political time and 
normative, prescriptive claims. My interest is in political theories that seek to address 
normative cosmopolitical questions about universal human rights, humanitarian 
intervention, global distributive justice and cosmopolitan democracy.5 My aim is to 
establish how it might be possible for political theory to be orientated in relation to 
the cosmopolitical present(s), without the orientalism targeted in Hindess’s analysis.6   
I begin with a return to Kant, who poses and resolves the problem of 
orientation in thinking in a way that has been particularly influential on later 
theorizations of world politics. I will argue that Kant’s claim as to the necessity of 
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orientation in thinking speaks to the impossibilityof judgement from nowhere, at the 
same time as it dissimulates this impossibility. It accomplishes this through a posited 
connection between Kant’s home in thought (enlightenment Europe) and an ‘as if’ 
end of history. This entanglement of temporal and normative assumptions makes 
timely judgment in Kant’s political theory possible. This is the kind of judgment that 
aims to make a (normatively) positive difference to the world, by contributing to the 
progressive tendencies of the present. It is this kind of judgment that is at stake in 
most contemporary scholarship concerned with normative cosmopolitical questions.  
In the second and third sections of the article, I move on to examine two 
contemporary cosmopolitical theorists with progressive political agendas, Habermas 
and Connolly. These two thinkers present very different views about the orientation 
for thinking the world-political present(s). Whereas Habermas’s thought remains 
orientated by a strongly Kantian view of political time, Connolly explicitly rejects this 
view and articulates an alternative pluralized understanding of political time. I will 
argue that the timely judgment enabled by Habermas’s orientation for political 
thought comes at the expense of normative hierarchies that this orientation 
perpetuates between the cosmopolitan theorist and the global audience to, and on 
behalf, of whom he speaks. Connolly’s orientation, in contrast, suggests the 
possibility of a different kind of normative structure to the encounter between the 
cosmopolitical theorist and his actual and implied interlocutors, and therefore a 
different understanding of what timeliness in cosmopolitical theory might mean.   
 
Kant on Orientation 
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 In Kant’s essay ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, which comments on the dispute 
between Mendlessohn and Jacobi concerning knowledge of the existence of God, Kant 
describes how spatial orientation is only possible because of our subjective feeling of the 
distinction between right and left.7 He then draws out an analogy between orientation in 
relation to objects that can be experienced in space and time (sun, moon etc.) and orientation 
in judgments for which no intuition of the object is possible, such as in the case of the 
existence of God.8 In the case of the latter, nothing can be known about the reality of the 
object of judgment: 
It is at this point, however, that the right of the 
need of reason supervenes as a subjective 
ground for presupposing and accepting 
something which reason cannot presume to 
know on objective grounds, and hence for 
orientating ourselves in thought – i.e. in the 
immeasurable space of the supra-sensory 
realm which we see as full of utter darkness – 
purely by means of the need to reason itself.9  
 Kant goes on to distinguish between theoretical and practical judgments that exceed 
the realm of the objects of possible experience. In the case of the former, we may wish to 
pass judgment on the ultimate causes of things and thus end up invoking the existence of 
God. But this is not something we are obliged to do. In the case of the latter, we are 
compelled to pass judgment, in order for the highest good of morality, implied by the moral 
law, not to be simply an ideal.10 According to Kant, reason does not feel, yet ‘it perceives its 
own deficiency and produces a feeling of need through the cognitive impulse’11. This feeling 
of need is rational belief, subjectively certain but not objectively grounded. Rational belief in 
 5
God, as the independent highest good, operates as ‘the signpost or compass by means of 
which the speculative thinker can orientate himself on his rational wanderings in the field of 
supra-sensory objects’, and it operates as a guide to the thought and action of ordinary men 
(not philosophers).12 Kant’s focus in the essay is on the pitfalls of treating the existence of 
God as a demonstrable, theoretical truth.13 But his argument has broader implications, since it 
speaks to the practical requirement for a particular kind of connection to be drawn between 
phenomenal and noumenal realms. Subjective certainty of the existence of God is not 
necessary to authorise moral truths or to motivate moral action, but it is, on Kant’s account, 
necessary to provide a sense of moral direction for the moral subject.14 A kind of subjective 
feeling, analogous to the capacity to tell left from right, anchors and enables accurate moral 
navigation in the phenomenal realm.   
The importance of orientation in thinking for Kant, is evident in a variety of his writings 
on practical philosophy, including his anthropology and ethics.15 It plays a particularly 
significant role in his works on history and politics, in which Kant offers us a story of how 
nature, freewill and reason work complementarily to produce culture that, over time, ensures 
both juridical and moral progress for mankind.16 For Kant, nature supplies crucial ingredients 
of human history, from climate to instinctual drives, but these must not be confused with 
either freewill or with the human capacity to identify the requirements of autonomous reason 
and develop a genuinely rational (moral) will. According to Kant’s argument, the catalysts of 
desire and reason work along parallel, mutually reinforcing tracks.17 On the one hand, man’s 
‘unsociable sociability’ drives co-operation within and between states via competitive 
mechanisms. On the other hand, reason has the power to transform a ‘pathologically 
enforced’ union into a ‘moral whole’.  
These two kinds of stories, driven by distinctive principles, run through Kant’s 
philosophy of right and his philosophical histories.18 In ‘Perpetual Peace: a philosophical 
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sketch’, as well as in various speculative accounts of the origins and ends of human history, 
Kant links the possibility of progress specifically to the development of a certain kind of 
republican state, as well as to the implications of the practices of both commerce and war.19 
For Kant, therefore, choices based on both desire and reason drive history towards a 
condition of republican states, linked together in an ordered international society which 
recognises levels of state, international and cosmopolitan right. Nevertheless, it is also clear 
that Kant’s projected telos of perpetual peace can only be realised through the exercise of 
human will, which is reducible to neither natural nor rational determination. Kant therefore 
has a difficulty accounting for his assurance that the exercise of human will will actually 
follow the prescribed direction, whether willy-nilly (through the clash of interests and the 
pursuit of desire) or self-consciously (through the embrace of the moral law). Kant addresses 
this difficulty through a return to the question of orientation. 
In essays such as, ‘An Old Question Raised Again: is the human race continually 
progressing?’20 and ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’21, 
Kant differentiates his philosophy of history from a type of philosophical 
investigation into the principles governing historical development. In both essays he 
points to the impossibility of discerning an ethical direction (progressive, 
retrogressive, static) to human history on the basis of empirical evidence. He 
identifies this as a problem of perspective: ‘If the course of human affairs seems so 
senseless to us, perhaps it lies in a poor choice of position from which we regard it’22. 
The ideal position would be ‘the standpoint of Providence’, beyond history, from 
which the future can be seen (known). But this is not a standpoint available to human 
beings, so we need some other way of orientating ourselves, a signpost or rational 
belief that will enable judgment.  
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As with the existence of God ‘the right of the need of reason’ to assume progress in 
history is required in order to make the highest good something more than a mere ideal. In 
order to fulfil reason’s requirement of orientation in relation to world history and politics, 
Kant goes on to identify an event in empirical history that points to the ‘disposition and 
capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance towards the better’23. Not the 
French Revolution itself, but the sympathy it inspired in disinterested spectators of the 
revolution, that is to say the feelings of enlightened men, philosophers. 24 
The philosopher cannot be sure of what, if anything, propels the ‘arbitrary play of 
human freedom’, therefore he cannot be sure that empirical history is actually 
developing teleologically towards the ‘perfect civil union of mankind’. Because of 
this, it is necessary for the philosopher to interpret history as if it had a purpose in 
keeping with a rational, moral will. On the one hand, this keeps the hope of progress 
alive, but even more importantly, the judgement of history as if it were progress 
testifies to the ends of reason in the rational belief of the philosopher. Thus the 
historical intervention of the philosopher’s judgment can be cited to confirm the truth 
of his diagnosis of his own times and of the forces shaping history, even as he denies 
his ability to demonstrate a pattern of progress in the inchoate mess of empirical 
political events.  
The political task of philosophical history is to intervene in the empirical, to 
influence the judgement of leaders and populations, to encourage enlightenment and 
the self-conscious implementation of the political project of republican government 
and perpetual peace. The relation between past, present and future prescribed in 
Kant’s philosophical history is effectively guaranteed only by the degree to which the 
philosopher’s orientation is shared with others. This is an orientation that fuses, in the 
rational belief of the philosopher, the time of enlightenment in Europe as experienced 
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and witnessed in Kőnigsberg, with the ‘immeasurable time’ of the highest good. This 
rational belief, a feeling that is no feeling, is also the affective core of being Kant the 
philosophical spectator. And being Kant, or being like Kant, makes possible the kinds 
of readings of history that will contribute towards world-historical progress. 
Kant’s orientation for thinking world politics is premised on the theoretical 
impossibility of ‘seeing’ from ‘nowhere’ coupled with the practical necessity to do 
precisely this. This paradox is resolved through the subjective certainty of the thinker 
that history must be read as if it were progress.  This means that when it comes to 
orientation in thinking about world politics, it is a question of space, time and a 
consequent timeliness embodied in the philosopher himself. The orientation in terms 
of sympathetic reaction to the French Revolution operates so as to unify the 
space/time of the world (this is not about one nation but about all nations). This is 
world-historical and world-political time, it is also the present, a global ‘now’ with 
implications for all future presents that are only fully apparent to the philosopher, 
whose interventions in debate are therefore timely in a way that holds genuine 
promise for the future. The philosophical spectator takes on the role, and also the 
obligations, of Providence.  
In terms of its implications for cosmopolitan political theory, whether explanatory 
of normative, Kant’s orientation for political thinking organizes the world, spatially, 
temporally and morally in a particular way. The world of nations acquires a centre 
and a future in which the highest good is manifested. Peripheral places become 
identified with temporal as well as spatial distance, backward in the progressive 
workings of history. But this spatio-temporal distance is also a moral distance. The 
fusion of noumenal and phenomenal worlds in the subjective certainty of the 
spectators of the French Revolution testifies to their capacities for moral navigation, 
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capacities that are in principle inherent in all rational beings, not just German 
philosophers. On Kant’s own account, though it is somewhat ambiguous when it 
comes to women and other races, no adult humans fall outside of the category of 
rational being.25 To the extent that others do not orientate their thought along Kantian 
lines, then they are in some kind of error. Two sorts of error are possible on Kant’s 
account of the human condition. There are wilful errors, in which rational beings 
knowingly act wrongly, and for which they should therefore be held responsible, in 
which case the vocabularies of guilt, shame and punishment are appropriate. But there 
are also inadvertent errors that follow from ignorance and immaturity, in which case, 
as with children, education is the answer.26 This means that spatio-temporally distant 
people and peoples, from the perspective of the rational belief of the philosopher, 
precisely because they are moral equals are a priori identified as in need of either 
punishment or education to set them right. 
 
Cosmopolitanism: Habermas and the ‘Kantian Project’ 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the substantive claims of Kant’s cosmopolitan political 
philosophy have been a crucial resource for a range of theorists attempting to tackle questions 
of global justice, human rights and cosmopolitan democracy.27 Amongst the most prominent of 
these is Habermas, who explicitly defends what he terms the ‘Kantian project’ of 
‘constitutionalizing’ international law as the appropriate normative (moral, legal and political) 
response to the spread of capitalist globalization and the threat of ethno-nationalism in the 
post-Cold War world. In his essay ‘The Kantian Project and the Divided West’28, Habermas 
defends the ongoing ‘juridification’ of international politics through a combination of 
philosophical and socio-historical argument, in which the questions of what international 
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politics is and what it ought to be are inextricably entangled with one another. The essay 
begins with a historical claim: 
Following two world wars, the constitutionalization 
of international law has evolved along the lines 
prefigured by Kant toward cosmopolitan law and has 
assumed institutional form in international 
constitutions, organizations and procedures.29 
Habermas explains this historical trend as the product of collective learning processes 
of a double kind.30 These learning processes reflect the lesson of the horrors of war but also the 
lesson learned within the modern constitutional state that law, properly understood, rationalizes 
power in a normatively positive way.31 It is the latter lesson that is most crucial, since it 
demonstrates the connection in principle between law and peace.32 Habermas reads the idea 
that there is a conceptual connection between peace and law back into the logical and historical 
implications of international law, which, he argues, have become increasingly, though still 
inadequately, constitutionalized during the twentieth century. He departs from Kant, however, 
in refusing the two options he (Kant) presents for the telos of inter-state relations, that of 
constitution as a world republic on the one hand,33 and that of the ‘league or confederation of 
nations’ on the other34. Instead, Habermas goes on to build on Kant’s analysis in a different 
way, arguing that the constitutionalization of international law is complementary rather than 
analogous to the constitutionalization of law within the state.35 According to Habermas, the 
kind of constitution already implicit in supranational and transnational organizations implies a 
multi-level system of authority. He sees the constitutions (founding treaties and charters) of 
existing organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and, above 
all, the European Union, as foreshadowing the shape that such a multi-level constitutionalized 
global order is likely to take.36   
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 Habermas’s adaptation of the ‘Kantian project’ attempts to draw out the logic implicit 
in the idea of law, but, as with Kant, goes beyond the realm of the ‘idea’ by identifying 
signposts within empirical history, specifically the empirical history of Western modernity. As 
with Kant also, however, Habermas is insistent that the necessary links between law and peace 
may not be empirically realised within the workings of historical time and that this therefore 
necessitates (makes the theorist responsible for) reading history from a cosmopolitan point of 
view.37 Kant, Habermas argues, used his philosophy of history to help render the cosmopolitan 
condition empirically probable and plausible. According to Habermas, Kant’s identification of 
cosmopolitan historical trends in his philosophy of history suffered from blind-spots inherent 
in his time and place, but nevertheless remains significant in principle insofar as it rests on ‘the 
cognitive procedure of universalization and mutual perspective-taking which Kant associates 
with practical reason and which underlies the cosmopolitan transformation of international 
law’38. Habermas therefore undertakes to read the history of international law and international 
politics in a way that does better justice to Kant’s insights into the real meaning of progress in 
history.  
Habermas goes on to offer a reading of the history of international politics and 
successive institutionalisations of international law that point to ways in which it accords with, 
and ways in which it runs counter to, any cosmopolitan promise. As well as cosmopolitan 
innovations in international law, such as the spread of international human rights law in the 
Cold War period or the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, there are also many examples 
of the redundancy and manipulation of the UN and its founding principles. In addition, these 
developments in the ‘high politics’ of international relations are situated in the wider context 
of , ‘the emergence of a world society, chiefly as a result of the globalization of markets and 
communication networks’39. However, although he does not claim that globalization is 
straightforwardly progressive (in his terms) in its effects, nevertheless Habermas does claim 
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that the pressures of globalization tend to strengthen the common interest of states in the rule 
of law and also socialize state actors to act in ways that acknowledge mutual dependence and 
increasingly undermine the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. The latter effect 
of globalization reinforces the principled link between all law and its (rationally required) 
legitimate grounding in democratic will-formation and fundamental human rights. This is 
exemplified, for Habermas, by the case of the EU in which ‘if the chains of democratic 
legitimation are not to break, civic solidarity must extend across former national borders 
within the enlarged communities’40. In this respect, globalization reinforces the previously 
relatively weak link between international law and ‘world citizens’ and greatly enhances the 
chances of the cosmopolitan logic of international law unfolding historically.41  
For Habermas,, the world-historical significance of Western modernity lies in its 
institutionalisation of practices of communicative rationalisation at the socio-political level. 
Just as for Kant, only societies that embed the principle of right in a republican constitution 
can bring politics into accord with the demands of practical reason, so for Habermas, only 
those societies that embed the possibility of discursive validation of claims to truth and justice 
can take forward the telos immanent in communicative action. Like Kant, Habermas, having 
identified the ideal telos of history, recognises that development towards that telos is not 
inevitable, and that one must distinguish between empirical and philosophical history. Like 
Kant also, however, he sees the task of the philosopher as being to further the promise of 
philosophical history by reading it ‘from a cosmopolitan point of view’, in which the idea of 
Europe (now instantiated as the European Union [EU]) as both centre and future is confirmed.  
On the one hand, the philosopher’s reading of history represents a transcendental moral 
judgment of what ‘ought to be’ a categorical imperative for those dedicated to progress. On the 
other hand, the reading of history is presented as immanent to historical development. On the 
one hand, progress is carried self-consciously by principles of self-reflexivity built into 
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complex societies, on the other hand it is carried willy nilly by processes such as globalization 
that intensify that complexity and carry it beyond state borders. Habermas’s argument 
replicates Kant’s in its reliance on a particular relation between the empirical (measurable 
time, phenomenal) and the moral (immeasurable time, noumenal), in which the latter is carried 
through, but also shapes the former. The role of the philosopher is both to interpret the 
meaning and direction of political time and to intervene to push historical development in the 
‘right’ direction. His insights are a product of his time and place (western modernity) but they 
are also universally valid and applicable (timely).  
Habermas’s arguments demonstrate how an orientation for thinking that involves the 
subjective identification of a particular place and time with the impossible ‘view from 
nowhere’ fuses the temporalization and moralization of world politics. The assumptions 
underlying Habermas’s ethical and historical-sociological claims are not the same as Kant’s. In 
particular, he completely rejects the hierarchical views about race and sex that we find in the 
earlier thinker. Nevertheless, when it comes to the reading of the present Habermas precisely 
echoes Kant’s strategy of reading progress into the developed western democratic states that 
constitute his own home for thought. And this inevitably inflects his reading of the relation 
between those kinds of states, their norms and cultures, and other kinds of states, norms and 
cultures. Aspirations towards a ‘positive’ version of perpetual peace in the contemporary 
world, are also always orientations towards principles and values that are inscribed in some 
(more grown up) parts of the world rather than others. The ways in which different parts of the 
world come into communication with each other are therefore asymmetrical in terms of their 
orientation towards the universal. 
The First World thus defines so to speak the meridian of a 
present by which the political simultaneity of economic and 
cultural nonsimultaneity is measured.42 
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The idea of ‘non-simultaneity’, which Habermas uses to describe the differential socio-
political realities of ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ world states in contemporary world politics is 
heavily normatively laden.43 To be ‘non-simultaneous’ with OECD countries, that is to say 
backward in relation to those countries, is to be out of step with progress in history, not purely 
on grounds of capacity, but also on grounds of political mentality. This does not mean that 
liberal democratic states always act rightly, it means rather that such states have special 
responsibilities, which reflect their particular capacity for timeliness, in an incomplete 
cosmopolitan condition. Two examples of such responsibilities to which Habermas draws 
attention are those of humanitarian intervention and cross-cultural dialogue. In relation to the 
former, Habermas is fully alive to the potential for powerful liberal democratic states, in the 
absence of a fully constitutionalized international order, to use doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention or ‘responsibility to protect’ in order to serve their own interests. Nevertheless, 
ultimately, it is only such states that can be trusted to undertake such actions, because these are 
the only states that have, as it were, subjectively internalised an orientation towards the 
universal end of history.  
When there is no other way, democratic 
neighbouring states must be permitted to 
intervene in an emergency in accordance with 
customary international law. But in such cases 
the incompleteness of the cosmopolitan 
condition demands exceptional sensitivity.44 
Something similar applies when it comes to cross-cultural dialogue. Habermas is fully 
sensible of the dangers of Western cultural imperialism, but he is also convinced that the 
orientation of the global world-historical present remains ‘the essentially unchanging horizon 
of social modernity and the associated normative self-understanding which developed after the 
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end of the eighteenth century’45. And until such time as the rest of the world catches up, 
Habermas is also clear that it is only within Western culture that the resources can be found for 
resisting Western cultural imperialism; ‘overcoming Eurocentrism demands that the West 
make proper use of its own cognitive resources’46. However much Western cultures and 
polities may have failed to live up to the ideal of mutual perspective taking, it is nevertheless 
within such cultures and polities that the potential to actualise such mutual perspective taking 
has been enabled and nurtured. The normative self-understanding of others either fails the test 
of communicative reason or testifies to the universalisation of the ‘horizon of social 
modernity’.  The kind of travelling involved in mutual perspective taking is therefore very 
different depending on your starting point. Whereas the Eurocentric westerner overcomes his 
eurocentrism by coming home, the traditionalist third-worlder or the chauvinistic second-
worlder overcomes his or her traditionalism or chauvinism by travelling westwards.The kind 
of conversation between different value systems that Habermas envisages, in spite of its overt 
insistence on respect for non-Western cultures, remains asymmetrical in much the same way as 
Kant’s implied conversation between enlightened and non-enlightened peoples. Precisely 
because moral equality is taken as foundational and the moral point of view is fused with the 
present of liberal democracy, the spatio/temporal other is identified at worst with guilt, but 
more often with immaturity.  
Habermas acknowledges the complexity of world politics, nevertheless, he confirms 
that the range of possibilities inherent in world politics derive from a temporal trajectory 
inherent (for good or ill) in western modernity.47 This is not simply because of the contingent 
fact that western powers acquired unprecedented global power over the course of the last few 
centuries, but because western political time is presumed to be world-political time, the time 
that drives or leads (or must be treated as if it drives or leads) historical development. 
Orientation in the time of enlightenment enables an overarching sense to be made of foreign 
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policy making, international law, global civil society activity, humanitarian intervention, 
global governance, multiculturalism and intra and inter-state politics in general. These 
temporal/ moral assumptions do not prevent Habermas from acknowledging that there are a 
variety of phenomena and events, of other histories and experiences, that play a role in world 
politics (phenomena which might include authoritarian capitalist states, religion, non-western 
culture, clientalist politics, imperialism, colonization). But Habermas reduces the significance 
of such phenomena for the purposes of diagnosis and prescription by relegating them 
simultaneously to the past and to the realm of moral failure.  
Kant’s argument, that there cannot be thought without orientation, follows from the 
impossibility of thinking without the subjective certainty that provides co-ordinates for the 
speculative thinker (going beyond the realm of experience), in the same way as the subjective 
consciousness of the distinction between right and left enables him to be located in the world of 
sense. His account of what orientation entails when it comes to practical reason, fuses a 
particular spatio-temporal location (home for thought) with the promise of the highest good. The 
place from which to think is, it turns out, his home. Kant’s argument sets up a co-incidence 
between spatio-temporal and moral homes that confronts later thinkers with the puzzle of how to 
reconcile the moral equality of individuals with the moral hierarchy of homes. Habermas 
resolves the puzzle by reference to different stages of collective moral learning that are 
embedded in transitions from simple to complex societies, and holds out the promise that with 
the right kind of home will come the right kind of thought.  
Of course, one way of responding to this would be to simply dismiss the claim that 
practical reason requires orientation, and to work to demonstrate how particular ethical/ political 
perspectives correspond to a ‘view from nowhere’. On this account, political theory does not and 
should not rely on any kind of claim that is not rationally demonstrable regardless of the 
subjective certainties of either the theorist or the audience to which his or her claims are 
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addressed. Which would mean that the claims of the right (correct) kind of political theory are 
always true and always timely. Contemporary cosmopolitan theories that take their cue from 
Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals or Critique of Practical Reason rather than 
from his writings on judgment, history, politics and anthropology, tend to assume an unmediated 
application of the rational (noumenal) to the phenomenal world.48 With the result that they are 
compelled to identify those out of step with the requirements of reason as irrational or wicked 
rather than backward or misled. But whether one takes a more or less thoroughly rationalist 
account of moral and political theory, the repertoire of possibilities for relating to those not at 
home in the theorists’ convictions is asymmetrical and hierarchical and does not disturb the 
presumption that the theorist possesses the authoritative key to the cosmopolitical present(s). 
Across the spectrum of cosmopolitanisms, prescriptive theories of global ethics and politics are 
built on the assumption that a large part of the world’s population is, at best, a junior, and largely 
silent, partner in the conversation. But if one seeks to avoid the paradoxical parochialism of 
rationalism and historicism in cosmopolitical thought, then one has to address the question of 
how thought may be orientated in a way that may generate different sorts of possibilities for 
transnational and global ethical and political engagement. 
 
Cosmopolitical times: Connolly’s disorientations of the ‘Kantian Project’ 
 
 William Connolly is one of a range of critical and postcolonial thinkers who are 
currently engaged in articulating non-Kantian answers to the Kantian question of what is 
orientation in thinking when it comes to addressing normative issues in the cosmopolitical 
present(s).49 As with Kant and Habermas, Connolly rejects the idea that there can be 
perspectiveless thinking. As with Kant and Habermas also, he is committed to progressive 
engagement with transnational and global ethical and political issues. In contrast to Kant and 
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Habermas, however, Connolly is unconvinced by a reading of world political time that identifies 
the moral universal with the time and space of western modernity through the ‘as if’ strategy of 
philosophical history. In place of the philosophical moves that synthesize world history into a 
singular, linear story with a past, present and future, Connolly proposes a radically different way 
of thinking about the temporality of world politics, and therefore also the spatio-temporal 
orientation of the normative theorist of world politics. Connolly’s ethical and political theory is 
oriented in time that is plural rather than singular and unpredictable rather than linear. This 
account of time is first articulated in his argument in Neuropolitics: thinking, culture, speed, 
where he characterizes the time of thinking as an ‘out of joint’ emergence and coming together 
of a range of virtual pasts in relation to an ongoing, given present which yields a previously 
unpredictable future.50 Connolly argues that the asymmetries in the temporality of thinking, 
which perpetually destabilize and transform the temporal organization of pasts, presents and 
futures, have their parallel in the experience of ‘out of jointness’ between different public, 
political temporalities.  
In this context Connolly engages with Wolin’s argument that in the contemporary world, 
political time is not synchronous with the temporalities governing communication and culture. 
For Wolin, political time needs to be slow in order to allow for the possibility of democratic 
political action and engagement, it is therefore necessary to resist the acceleration of time 
embedded in non-political orders, and revive a ‘politics of place’51. Connolly accepts the idea 
that there are asymmetries of temporal ordering within the contemporary world, but resists 
Wolin’s conclusion: 
 - - Wolin and I both reject the cyclical image of 
slow time adopted by many ancients. But I also 
find myself at odds with progressive, teleological, 
and linear conceptions of time set against it. 
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Against these four images I embrace the idea of 
rifts or forks in time that help to constitute it as 
time. A rift as constitutive of time itself, in which 
time flows into a future neither fully determined 
by a discernable past nor fixed by its place in a 
cycle of eternal return, nor directed by an intrinsic 
purpose pulling it along. Free time. Or, better, 
time as becoming, replete with the dangers and 
possibilities attached to such a world.52  
In Pluralism, Connolly further unpacks the meaning of time as ‘becoming’ suggested in 
the above quotation, by treating time in this sense as the interaction between immanent 
chronologies.53 This leads him to distinguish between two different sorts of temporality 
association with a ‘politics of being’ on the one hand, and a ‘politics of becoming’ on the other. 
A political temporality of being refers to relatively stable contexts for political judgment and 
action, on the basis of which one can extrapolate the meaning of progress in accordance with 
given, sedimented criteria. In contrast, the political temporality of becoming refers to shifting 
and unfamiliar contexts for political judgment and action, where criteria for the meaning of 
progress must be negotiated without the certainties embedded in a politics of being.54  
From Connolly’s point of view, Kantian cosmopolitan theories of world politics, such as 
that of Habermas, remain within the temporal register of the politics of being, and have therefore 
been unable to do justice to either plurality or unpredictability in their diagnoses of the times. For 
Connolly, such theorists, in their evaluation of the promise of the world-political present, are 
caught up in a ‘concentric’ understanding of culture, in which a particular, parochial temporality 
is treated as if it can generate the force that will bind increasingly distant circles of humanity 
together. Both cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan thinkers, according to Connolly, fail to 
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appreciate the eccentric temporal flows that cut across and disrupt the circles of a concentric 
vision of the world, and that do so as much within the ‘inner circle’ of liberalism or capitalism as 
in the outer circles of ‘others’.55 Connolly argues that ‘presentness’ is always constituted by a 
plurality of ‘presents’ inscribed in diverse, immanent temporalities and he rejects the idea that 
any unifying temporal orientation provides the master key to the meaning of ‘presentness’. His 
reading of political time is simultaneously a critique of the ‘concentric’ orientation in thinking 
that dominates cosmopolitan political theory and the basis for a different  mode of orientation for 
thought in which the contingent and ongoing cross-contamination of different temporal orderings 
becomes the starting point for understanding and judgment.56  
In a comment on some recent interpretations of his work in the British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Connolly attempts to spell out what is meant by this kind of 
orientation towards ethical and political thought in an era of globalization. He describes such an 
orientation as the risky endeavour of keeping your place whilst at the same time being open to 
your own displacement, simultaneously centred and decentred. 
The gift involves listening on several registers to 
others whose clamour disturbs and disrupts something 
in you. The risk is that you may succumb to 
premature closure or that your pluralist response may 
be rejected or that you will concede too much.57 
There is a marked contrast between Connolly’s account of what follows from his pluralized 
orientation for thought and Habermas’s account of the responsibilities of cross-cultural dialogue in 
cosmopolitical times. For Habermas, ethical engagement with other ‘nonsimultaneous’ cultures 
and mentalities is enabled through his living up to the reason inherent in his own time. The 
aspiration of mutual perspective taking is taken to be inherent in the resources for thought opened 
up (as well as closed down) by western modernity. But this means that the perspectives taken by 
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the parties to communicative engagement place the interlocutors not just differently but also 
hierarchically. To live up to the best inscribed in your own present, and which you know to be the 
direction in which history should be treated as travelling, is different than to be obliged to 
overcome your present in order to live up to a putative, alien future. It’s not that the western 
theorist cannot be wrong or guilty, but to the extent that he or she is mistaken or wicked, it is 
because he or she fails to live up to his or her own standards, to be punished or corrected is to 
come home, not to be expelled from home. On this account, affective disturbance, at the level of 
who you are as opposed to what you do, is confined to the interlocutors of the western theorist, 
who, in their guilt or backwardness, live the painful dislocation of their non-contemporaneity with 
western political time.  
In contrast, for Connolly, ‘listening on several registers to others whose clamour disturbs 
and disrupts something in you’ the theorist is as open to affective disturbance as his interloculators. 
To operate with a pluralised, non-linear temporal orientation is not simply to work with the 
acknowledgement that you may be wrong , on Connolly’s account, but to lay yourself open to the 
pain of being temporally/ morally ‘out of joint’, of becoming the equivalent of the child or the 
transgressor.58 Unlike Kant’s philosophical spectator, whose grasp of the times is more essential 
than that of those making the times, Connolly’s ‘immanent naturalist’59 participates in the same 
partiality that characterizes all political action. There is no route to the ‘immeasurable time’ of a 
supersensible beyond. Instead there is only a plurality of out of jointness of selves and others with 
themselves and others, a multiplicity of simultaneous orientation and disorientation.   
But in what sense is this orientation at all? It would seem rather to correspond to the 
position, often referred to by Connolly, of Nietzsche’s madman announcing the death of God in 
terms of a fundamental disorientation, in which the possibility of judgment, and therefore of 
timeliness in political theory, is completely undermined. How can the political or ethical theorist 
represent, speak for, and make a difference to the future of world politics in terms of the present, 
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when his or her rational belief is no longer regarded as fusing the distinction between measurable 
and immeasurable time? Or, put another way, how is it possible to engage in productive ethical 
and political thinking that is, to borrow from Chakrabarty, heterotemporally orientated?60 Connolly 
tackles this question by trying to think through the implications of his argument for the conduct of 
relations with others with whom he disagrees. He speaks of the possibility of ‘a relation of 
agonistic respect between orientations’ that can only emerge out of a different relation to one’s 
subjective certainties than we find in the Kantian model of the moral and political theorist.61 For 
the latter, the relation between subjective certainty and spatio-temporal location operates as a 
virtuous circle. In finding confirmation of moral certainties (which are in principle empirically 
indemonstrable) in his own historical place and time, the philosopher is simultaneously 
contributing to the global realization of those certainties. For the  moral and political theorist 
oriented in terms of plural and non-linear time, however, this is a vicious circle in which 
parochialism in thought and politics is perpetually reaffirmed. If thought requires orientation, then 
the circle can only be broken by the kind of affective work (punishment and education) on 
subjective certainty that Kantian and Habermasian cosmopolitanisms reserve for those who are 
standardly positioned as simultaneously in the time/place of the human being worth of respect, and 
dislocated from it to the position of the child and/or the transgressor.  
 
 
Conclusion 
  
 
There is a fast growing cosmopolitan literature on issues such as humanitarian intervention, 
human rights and global justice, which is largely dominated by a Kantian orientation in ethical and 
political theory. Habermas is only one of a number of theorists who see humanitarian intervention 
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as embodying the moral ethos of modernity and signifying the radical potential of our particular 
world-political present. A heterotemporal orientation to theorising cosmopolitical times decentres 
the position of the Kantian critic by questioning the assumption of a fusion between his or her 
particular present and ‘the’ present of world politics. It raises the question as to why 
humanitarianism should be taken as a sign of the distinctiveness of the world-political present. For 
whom, and from whose perspective is this a novel development? Does it mark a normative 
difference in the conduct of world politics or simply confirm a set of longstanding patterns? To 
raise the question of novelty is to disturb the kinds of subjective certainty, of ‘at homeness’ in 
thought, that render phenomena such as humanitarian intervention straightforwardly timely. In this 
respect, a heterotemporal orientation makes the work of the theorist much harder, since it requires 
the painful, political effort of cross-temporal engagement without the short cuts enabled by the 
taken for granted fusion of his or her particular present with the end of history.62   
In only ever being partially at home, heterotemporally oriented normative judgment 
partakes of the partiality and revisability of the presents to which it is immanent. If humanitarian 
intervention is identified with the potential globalization of justice, then a heterotemporal 
orientation would suggest that what is needed is to begin by acknowledging and examining 
political temporalities of violation, in order to understand the meanings of injustice in the present. 
This would enable judgment of the likely effects of the institutionalisation of particular normative 
priorities in the principles and practices of international humanitarianism. But it would also open 
up the question of what kinds of violation matter and why, and offer a different route to the 
establishment of international hierarchies of outrage than that reflected in the moral priorities of 
existing international human rights regimes. The world’s ‘clocks’ may or may not already chime in 
harmony on these issues, but from the viewpoint of heterotemporality this is something to be 
discovered rather than assumed.  
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Within predominant contemporary diagnoses of, and prescriptions for, world politics the 
problem is not that the co-existence of a plurality of orientations goes unrecognised, so much as 
that the meaning of this plurality is always already homogenised by reference to the authoritative 
space/time of western modernity. It is the subjective certainty of this orientation that not only 
grounds the theorist’s judgment but also enables it to make a difference in practice, through 
timely prescription and through example. Connolly’s argument holds out the promise of a 
different kind of timeliness for ethical and political thought, one that renders the work of the 
theorist less heroic and less certainly effective. Instead of being the one who already knows the 
time, the heterotemporally oriented theorist is fundamentally uncertain of his own punctuality. 
The extent to which his interventions are or are not timely will depend on the moral/temporal 
certainties and uncertainties (orientations) of his interlocutors. And any making of the times will 
necessarily be a collaborative enterprise. 
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